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I.

ADOPTION AND THE CLASH OF RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES

Adoption law in the United States, depending on whom you ask, is
either at a turning point or hopelessly gridlocked.1 Many issues seem to
defy consensus. Media reports of high profile adoption cases2 have attracted
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1.
After a five year effort, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed the
carefully crafted and comprehensive UNIF. ADOPTION AcT (1994), which has created great
dissension and has failed to garner support from many influential constituencies. Mark Hansen, Fears of the Heart, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 58, 59-60. In the 1980s, the ABA Family Law
Section also spent several years working on a model adoption act that never made it out of
committee. Similarly, a federal effort to draft a uniform act failed to produce any comprehensive legislation. Id. at 62.
Baby Jessica DeBoer's failed adoption made headlines when she was removed
2.
from the DeBoer family, with whom she had lived from birth to age two and a half. Jessica's
biological mother had lied about the father's identity and the true biological father later appeared to assert his rights. Ellen Goodman, Parents' "Property" Rights Top Kids' Adoption Interests, CHL. TRM., Aug. 1, 1993, §5 (Tempo), at 4 (In re Clausen (DeBoer v. Schmidt), 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993)). The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the Baby
Richard case involving a similar fact pattern (In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Il.) cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 499 (1994)). Here, the birth father was told that his son had died. After the child's
adoptive placement, the birth father came forward to challenge the adoption. Associated Press,
Court Reverses Adoption Awards Son, 3, to Parents, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1994, at 1. At the time
of this writing, the illinois Supreme Court has issued an order directing the adoptive parents
to surrender the child to the biological father without any provision for a hearing on the
child's best interest and the U.S. Supreme Court has denied an application to stay the order
(O'Connell v. Kirchner, No. A-555, 1995 WL 55384 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1995)). Baby Emily is a
Florida infant whose biological mother placed her for adoption after the father pressured the
*
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enormous attention, not only because of their inherent drama, but also because they implicate highly contested definitions of what makes a family.
Many of the most volatile adoption issues are couched in terms of rights: the
birth mother's right to confidentiality; the adoptive parent's right to be treat-

ed equally without regard to race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation;
the rights of a racial, ethnic, or national community to custody and control
of children born into that community; the adult adoptee's right to information about her origins; the right of unwed fathers to veto the birth mother's
adoption decision, and so on, ad infinitum. These clashes of rights highlight
the tensions between claims of blood and nurture, biological and social con-

nection, and individual and communal definitions of self.
Of all the debates, the furor over racial matching in adoption is perhaps
the most problematic for American legal culture. Most recently in the United
States, Congress enacted the Multiethnic Placement Act (MPA).3 Originally
designed to avoid delay stemming from reluctance to place children in

homes with parents of another race or ethnicity, the MPA has become a
battleground for competing visions of individual and group identity and has
revived longstanding controversies about what role, if any, children's community of origin should play in adoptive placements. The very notion of
preserving children's cultural or ethnic identities seems to conflict with liberal conceptions of parents' and children's individual rights, ideals of color-

blind equality, and a peculiarly American kind of liberty embracing the
freedom to reinvent oneself as a new citizen of a new world.
Missing from the debate, however, is a coherent schema for articulating

children's rights to preservation of their identity in adoption. Perhaps this is
partially because we think of children not as subjects claiming rights under
law, but as objects of law-making who have relatively nebulous and indeterminate "interests."

In this Essay, I purposely shift the focus from adults' rights, whether
those of parents or of cultural and ethnic communities, to the continuing
task of developing a schema of children's rights to preservation and support
of their identity. I propose to apply this schema in addressing the dilemmas
of racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural identity in adoption policy. I will
suggest a fluid conception of identity rights reflecting children's own evolv-

mother to get an abortion; now the father claims a right to veto the adoption in spite of his
prenatal conduct and a history of convictions for rape and assault. Larry Barszewski, Judges
Agonize Over Baby Emily Case, SUN SENTINEL (Palm Beach, Fla.), Dec. 2, 1994, at lB. The last
decision from the 4th District Court of Appeal of Florida in November of 1994 favored the
adoptive parents (In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So.2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1994)).
At the time of this writing, the case is before the Florida Supreme Court. Larry Barszewski,
Adoption Lawyer Sometimes Stirs Up Controversy, SUN SENTINEL (Palm Beach, Fla.), Feb. 9, 1995,
at lB. Gregory K. is the 11 year old child now known as Sean Russ who, after many years
in foster care, sought successfully to sever his biological mother's rights in order to be adopted by the Russ family. Michael E. Young, Standing Up for Children, SUN SENTINEL (Palm
Beach, Fla.), Sept. 19, 1993, at 1A (Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780, rev, denied, 634 So.2d
625 (Fla. 1994)).
3.
Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, PUB. L. NO. 103-382,
§§ 551-54, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (1994) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994)) [hereinafter MPA].
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ing capacities and developmental concerns as well as their need for family
and group.
Wary as I am of the destructive potential of "rights talk,"4 I have chosen in other writings to consciously adopt a discourse of "needs-based
rights" to describe children's so-called interests5 I do so because of my conclusion that, in a rights-oriented legal culture, children need more than the
weak reed of a claim to "interests" if they are to make their needs and voices heard.6 I will argue that a child-centered, relational, and evolving understanding of children's identity rights can provide the crucial point of intersection in the dialogue about race, culture, and ethnicity in adoption.
II. PLACING ISSUES OF IDENTITY IN A NARRATIVE AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Legal norms have long reflected children's needs for nurture and for
protection from harm, but legal norms also increasingly recognize the importance of children's familial, cultural, and national identities. For example,
Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes "the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations."7 In the United States, at the federal level
the principle of group identity or consciousness is present in civil rights
remedies like affirmative action,8 and in laws which discourage placement of
Native American children outside their tribe.9 These laws further direct that
concepts like neglect or abandonment be viewed through the lens of Native
American cultural norms." On the local level, many jurisdictions use kinship preferences in adoption and foster care or racial, religious, or ethnic
matching to maintain children's identification with family and culture."

4.

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

9-15 (1991) (arguing that "rights talk" has stifled political discourse in the United States).
5.
See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1814-20 (1993) (discussing parents' authority over children
and their obligations to children, and each other, through the lens of children's needs and
experiences) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg]; Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Out of
Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L.
321, 321-24 (1994) (suggesting a new rights discourse regarding children's rights to have their
basic needs met by adults) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Children's Needs].
6.
See Woodhouse, Children's Needs, supra note 5, at 329-33 (developing a basis in
history and international law for a needs-based description of children's rights within the
family).
7.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 8, Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1448, 1456 [hereinafter Convention]. Other articles protect religious and cultural heritage. Id., arts. 14, 30, at 1462, 1468. For a general discussion of the Convention, see
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED
WITH UNITED STATES LAW (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard Davidson eds., 1990) [hereinafter
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS].
8.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988) (permitting remedies to correct particular denials of
equal educational opportunity); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993) (permitting reinstatement, hiring or any other equitable relief for employees who have been discriminated
against).
9.
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
10.
Id. § 1915(d).
11.
See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS 95-99 (1993) (citing a study of the North
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This recognition of a communal identity conflicts with interpretations of
individual rights and equal treatment provided by modem constitutional
jurisprudence. 2 It is also unclear how such identity rights apply to children
who have lived apart from their family, group, or nation of origin and have
developed their own social and psychological identities through interactions
with their environment. The nature of adoption-creation by the state of a
new, nonbiological family-forces us to raise questions about children's individual identity versus group identity. In addition, adoption requires us to
examine how we conceptualize children's relationship to community and
state, their individual and collective past, present, and future. Does consideration of race or ethnicity violate the prospective adopter's equal protection
rights? Does it violate the child's rights to equal protection or to the "best"
available placement? And how does the passage of time, during which children grow and evolve, acquiring and shedding identities, affect these conflicting rights and interests?
A. Thinking About Identity
Identity itself is a contested and contextual concept. Judith Masson and
Christine Harrison have described identity as "an organizing framework
which holds the past and present together providing some anticipated shape
to future life." 3 In the history of child psychology, Erik Erikson's influential
theories located identity achievement as the fifth in eight stages of development. 4 Margaret S. Mahler, a student of children's earliest developmental
tasks and experiences, defined identity as "the earliest awareness of a sense
of being, of entity ....

It is not a sense of who I am but that I am." 5

Mahler's theory associated identity formation with the child's emerging
awareness that she is separate from, yet completely dependent upon, those
who nurture her and to whom she is attached. 6 These descriptions of identity focus on the internal life of the individual and on the individual's intimate relationships.
Modem child development scholars increasingly have acknowledged the
role of the larger social order and surrounding cultural environment in shaping and defining identity.' Clearly, many aspects of identity are more so-

American Council on Adoptable Children finding that 76% of state agencies had racial
preferences) [hereinafter BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS].
12.
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding that potential jurors, as
well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures, in both civil and
criminal trials); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(reaffirming a woman's right to have an abortion prior to fetal viability).
13.
Judith Masson & Christine Harrison, Identity: Mapping the Frontiers, Paper Presented Before the 8th World Congress of the International Society for Family Law 2 (June 28July 2, 1994) (on file with author).
14.
See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH, AND CRISIS (1968); ERIK H.
ERIKSON, CHILDREN AND SOCIETY (1977).
15.

(1975).
16.
17.

MARGARET S. MAHLER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT 8

Id.
See generally STEWART COHEN, SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT IN CHILD-
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cially prescribed and attributed than they are individually chosen and personally enacted.18 In this process, law is both an active agent in prescribing,
proscribing, and attributing identity, and a public medium for choosing and
enacting it. 9
In legal discussions of children's identity, as in many debates about
adoption or custody, children have often figured as passive objects whose
identity (like title in property) can be transferred with a stroke of the pen
from one to another name, family, and group. But children, scientists tell us,
are not blank slates. They arrive in the world with a lively genetic heritage
and become active participants in construction or reconstruction of those
internal frameworks that constitute identity. Although the role of biology is
still under investigation, most studies agree that genetic heritage shapes not
only physical appearance, but also personality." On the other hand, psychologists tell us that children begin to construct and enact their own "personal identity" from a very early age, through attachments to caregivers and
through interactions with their family environment.2 At six months of age,
children (through the lens of social interaction) have already begun to recognize their "native" tongue (the one they hear from infancy) and identify
their "parents" (the people who care for them).' They grow as individuals,
but in relation to the people and the cultures around them.
A child's identity, moreover, is far from a static concept. We parents
know that children play an ongoing role in the evolution of their own identities, in constant dialogue with their surroundings. Children evolve and
their needs change. For young children, who experience self, family, and
community in highly concrete terms, continuity and stability of their attachments to intimate caregivers may be of paramount importance in forming a
coherent sense of self. As children mature and their capacities for understanding evolve, they are able, and often appear driven, to integrate more

HOOD (1976); DAVID ELKIND, THE CHILD AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN APPLIED CHILD DEVELOPMENT

(1979); DAVID INGELBY, DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIAL CONTEXT (1986); LEON J. YARROW ET AL.,
INFANT AND ENVIRONMENT: EARLY COGNITIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1975).

Masson & Harrison, supra note 13, at 3-4.
18.
19.
Compare the coercive force of an action to establish paternity and the enactment
of an adoption proceeding; contrast the personal choice of a marital partner of the opposite
sex with the proscription against marriage between persons of the same sex.
20.

LAURA E. BERK, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 109, 404-05 (2d ed. 1991).

21.
Elsewhere, I have used the term "social" parent and family to describe the relationships that a child forms through interaction with her environment and caregivers. I have
used the term "genetic" family to describe relationships of biological connection. Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg, supra note 5, at 1747, 1758. In this discussion, I will use the term "personal
identity" to describe the personal sense of self and connection to others that a child acquires
through interaction with her social family. I will use the term "identity of origin" to describe
the child's identification, both by others and by herself, as belonging by birth, either physically or historically, to a particular racial, ethnic, or cultural community. I do not attempt to
draw a bright line between the two terms, since they are obviously interconnected. Nor do I
decide whether concepts like race and ethnicity are objectively defined or subjectively constructed. I am interested in children's experiences and children inhabit a world in which personal, social, biological, racial, and ethnic identities, whatever their origin, are all powerful
factors.
22.
BERK, supra note 20, at 352-53.
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complex understandings of their own identity and of their membership (attributed and chosen) in biological, social, and cultural families and groups.

Although various groups may claim a right of custody or control of their
children, a child-centered perspective would suggest that the right to preservation of a group identity of origin is best analyzed as a right of the child,
and a responsibility or trust of the group.
B. Competing Definitions of "Best Interest"

Much of the debate about transcultural and transracial adoptions, international adoptions, and racial matching has centered on the effects on children of being raised in social families who differ from the children's race or

ethnicity of origin.' Proponents of transracial adoption argue that acquiring
racial identity and coping skills is not contingent on being raised by same

race parents but on the parents' sensitivity to the child's needs and on
healthy early attachments.24 Critics of transracial adoption argue that children must struggle, sometimes unsuccessfully, to acquire a positive racial

identity when neither parent can provide a same race role model.' They
argue that children of color need to be raised by parents of color in communities of color in order to acquire the "coping skills" necessary for survival
in a racist society.'

Having followed the many studies that purport to measure transracially
adopted children's well-being, I am certainly not persuaded by its critics that
transracial adoption creates a serious risk of harm to children, especially
when the alternative is prolonged delays in placement and foster care
drift.27 Nor am I persuaded by those who believe that considerations of race

and culture should be banned as a form of racial separatism and as irrelevant to the adoptee's interests. My uneasiness with policies advocating either
23.
BARTHOLEr, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 11, at 143. Many authors have addressed
issues of transracial adoption and racial identity; see generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do
Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991)
[hereinafter Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?]; James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences
and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of
the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487 (1987-88); Joan Mahoney, The Black Babn Doll: TransracialAdoption
and Cultural Preservation, 59 UMKC L. REv. 487 (1991); Angela T. McCormick, Note, Transracial
Adoption: A Critical View of the Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 304 (1989-90); Shari
O'Brien, Race in Adoption Proceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485 (1986); Twila L
Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interest Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L.
51 (1991); David Rosettenstein, Trans-Racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference Schemes: Before
the "Best Interests" and After the Melting Pot, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 137 (1994). For a comprehensive review of the research to date, see Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of TransracialAdoption THE FLrURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 104, 117 (adoption issue) (David and Lucille
Packard Foundation ed., 1993) (concluding that transracial adoption is a viable means of providing stable homes for waiting children and presents fewer risks to children than delayed
placement and institutional care).
24.
See Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?, supra note 23, at 1213 (citing positive results in studies comparing transracially and intracially adopted children).
25.
See, e.g., Marion N. Yarbrough, Transracial Adoption: The Genesis or Genocide of Minority Cultural Existence, 15 S.U. L. Rev. 353, 355-56 (1988).
26.
Id. at 356.
27.
See Silverman, supra note 23, at 115.
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relentless race-matching or relentless race-blindness goes beyond the obvious
difficulties of gathering data and creating scientifically sound techniques of
measurement that might prove conclusively that one or the other policy is in
children's best interest. In my view, there simply is no easy empirical answer to the question whether transracial and transcultural adoption are
"good" or "bad" for children. In an objective sense, it is impossible to say
that a child has acquired a "good" or "bad" self concept or acquire a
"healthy" or "unhealthy" individual, racial, or cultural identity without also
making tacit judgments about relative values of sameness and difference,
individual and group, independence and interdependence.
Kim Forde-Mazrui, in his Note "Black Identity and Child Placement: The
Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children,"' makes explicit the many ambiguities and underlying value choices inherent in discussions of whether
inracial or transracial placements better serve children's needs for "racial
identity" and "coping skills."' He also identifies these elements in debates
about whether the placements advance or impede "progress" of individual
black and biracial children and blacks as a group.' Forde-Mazrui questions
a number of assumptions others have made in discussions about racial identity: must a racial identity be "strong" in order to be "positive?"31 Must a
child identify with "black culture" in order to acquire a positive racial identity? He compares two hypothetical people, one who says:
"I am a husband and a father, a writer, a teacher, and a musician. I am also
Black, a man, and a Methodist." The second person replies: "I am Black, and
I am a doctor; I am a mother, a wife, and a Presbyterian. I also write poetry

and sing in a choir." Does the second person necessarily have a healthier
identity because race is a priority? Can one even conclude that the second
person's racial identity is more positive? In fact, the first person may feel
equally or more positive about being Black although he gives it less significance.n

In continuing his analysis, Forde-Mazrui challenges the view that identification with black culture is a necessary predicate to acquisition of "coping
skills." He claims:
Rightly or wrongly, achievement in American society generally inures to
those whose values and motivations track the dominant culture....
Transracial adoptees are more likely to embrace the achievement goals of the
dominant culture and, in turn, achieve greater success in school than
inracially placed black children. Therefore, in terms of coping with the demands of academic achievement, transracial placement is not only as good
as, but arguably better than, same-race placement.'

28.
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and
Biracial Children, 92 MxCH. L. Rrv. 925 (1994).
29.
Id. at 926-27.
30.
Id. at 945, 959.
31.
Id. at 949-50; see also Silverman, supra note 23, at 115 (suggesting that although
transracially adopted children may have a positive racial identity, they may not have a racial
identity as strong as that of a children in same race placement).
32.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 28, at 950.
33.
Id. at 951-52.
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Turning to skills for coping with racism, he argues that these too are ambiguous, since "white parents, by demphasizing race, may enable a Black child
to cope better with racial attacks because the child may view the attacks less
personally. " '
As Forde-Mazrui's discussion so sharply illustrates, perspectives on
what constitutes human flourishing are highly contingent. Many feminists
have drawn contrasts between the dominant individualist perspective and
what they identify as a more relational perspective on flourishing, good, and
evil.' A reader grounded in a culture of individual achievement, self definition, and material success may resonate to the wisdom of Kim FordeMazrui's arguments, while a reader grounded in a culture of identity defined by social relationship, self-effacement, and group solidarity may turn
away in dismay. Certainly, Forde-Mazrui himself speaks from a unique perspective. He is the biracial child of a marriage between a Caucasian woman
and an African man; he is the adoptive parent of a "black" child; and he is
legally blind.' His experience illustrates how infinitely complex and diverse
the experience of race in America can be. Fundamental differences over the
meaning of a "good" life and a "whole" self will remain, even after social
scientists have perfected methodological techniques to measure children's
adjustment over time, to compare adoptions in different social settings and
at different ages, and to establish control groups for assessing concepts like
"strength of identity."
The debate about racial matching has raised a host of questions that I
do not plan to address since they beg the central question and seem to
evade any logical resolution. These include whether there is such a thing as
"race" or whether race is merely a cultural construct? Similarly, I acknowledge the dilemma in deciding to what "race" or "culture" a child of mixed
heritage "belongs." While I have no answer to these questions, I reject the
notion that their indeterminacy forecloses discussion of race in child
placement. My premise is that race and culture of origin, no matter how
hard to define with satisfying logic, do matter to children and therefore
should matter in adoption law. They may well be contingent and socially
constructed, but children's awareness of race and group identity indicate that
they are "real" for the purposes that matter here-the fostering and protection of children's identity.

34.
Id. at 953-54. Forde-Mazrui does not argue that transracial adoption is superior to
inracial adoption, but rather that there is no logical basis for preferring one over the other
and the law ought, therefore, to be race neutral in regard to adoptive placement. Id. at 955,
966-67.
35.
See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 29 (1982); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, in AT THE BOUNDARIEs OF LAW: FEMINISM
AND LEGAL THEORY 115, 123 (Martha Fineman & Nancy S. Thompson eds., 1991).
36.
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Remarks Before the DeBoer Committee for Children's Rights
Conference (Oct. 2, 1994).
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C. The Role of Narrative in Reformulating Children's Rights
In this Essay, I employ both theoretical and narrative frameworks to
explore the tensions between preserving children's individual and group
identities. These tensions are apparent in children's struggle to affirm the
social families that they construct through experience while preserving their
connection with their communities and families of origin. Although especially salient in adoption, these conflicts are present in every family and every
cultural or national community. To structure the discussion and to give it
emotional and narrative context, I draw upon stories from children's lives, as
well as stories about children and for children. Stories provide a window on
children's experience from which to draw not facts, but meaning.' Narratives contextualize the child's intertwined needs for caregiving and connection, immediate nurture and longterm continuity. The issues children's stories raise can help us in thinking about transracial adoption, international
adoption, and many other settings in which claims of community identity
and ownership conflict with concepts of individual rights and the child's
individualized best interest. In each of these contexts, the issues are placed
in sharpest conflict when some tragedy or simply the passage of time has
eliminated what most would agree is the first choice solution-a child nurtured to adulthood in her family and community of origin.
There is another reason why I find children's stories helpful in talking
about family law. It is easier to deal with the really terrifying monsters, as
children well know, when they are presented in terms of an elephant's or a
bird's fanciful journey. They capture your imagination because you know
there are "real" monsters lurking under your own bed or rattling the door
to your own basement. Beginning with children's stories, I find, helps to
defuse the passions that surround these discussions.' I borrow this trick
from a wonderful teacher, my colleague Lani Guinier who uses colors like
blue, yellow, and green to talk about dividing political power among various
communities under the Voting Rights Act. Transracial adoption, like any
issue involving race, is a hot button issue-as my friend and mentor Gail
Laster, who was instrumental in shepherding the Multiethnic Placement Act
through Congress, and her employer, Senator Howard Metzenbaum discovered. Gail is an African-American woman married to an Italian-American
man and mother of the curious and intelligent three-year-old, Jordan. Gail
Laster and her daughter know that issues of racial identity are not just academic or political, but concrete and personal.
Accordingly, I will use stories to illustrate how a child-centered perspective on the dilemma of identity might help to resolve many tensions between claims of biology and nurture in adoption and might even bridge the
ideological divisions over group and individual rights to children's custody
and control. I will argue that an analysis that begins with parental or group

37.

DONALD E. POLINGHORNE, NARRATWE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN SCIENCEs 6-8

(1988).
38.
See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1138 (1991).
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"rights" over children tends to polarize, rather than move forward, the debates about who children are and about where and by whom they should be
raised. I have developed elsewhere my argument for a child-centered perspective on parents' rights that conceptualizes parental power as a form not
of ownership, but of trusteeship.39 Children, I argue, do not (and in fact
cannot) develop into adults in isolation. They grow embedded in families
and groups and they actively derive their identities from their family and
group membership as well as from their relationships with individual
caregivers.
III. CHILDREN'S STORIES AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

In an attempt to illustrate the complex relationships that define
children's lives, I begin with an unlikely authority, children's stories. I will
particularly focus on the "I Can Read" book by Paul Eastman titled Are You
My Mother in addition to a source I have used before, Dr. Seuss's Horton
Hatches the Egg.4 These storybook tales about an elephant who hatches an
egg and a baby bird in search of a mother are "silly" fiction. What does Dr.
Seuss have to do with issues of race and culture in adoption? I will explain.
I have long been a student of the relationships between children and
their caregivers, not only as a professor of children's law and an advocate
for children, but also as a former nursery school teacher, the parent of two
and sometimes three,' and as a former child myself. Children's literature
provides a window on children's feelings about the child-parent relationship.
Beloved classics of children's literature, like children's own stories about
themselves, deserve respect and attention in our search for meaning in
children's law and policy, because they speak in complex visual and sensory
images that are especially meaningful to children.
A. Horton Hatches the Egg: A Child's Right to Protection of Family
Relationships Formed Through Nurture and Care
In my article, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights," I use the classic story of Horton Hatches the Egg' to provide a visual metaphor for the social and psychological relationship that forms between a child and the adult who faithfully cares for her. H-orton, for those
readers unfamiliar with the story, was "faithful one hundred percent' to
an egg that had been left in his care by a certain irresponsible Mayzie bird
who promptly flew off to Palm Beach. When the egg hatched, out came an
elephant-bird.
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Children love this story about the elephant who hatches the abandoned
bird's egg. They know that the story is about them and their survival, and
they know that the egg would not remain warm and intact long enough to
hatch without Horton's sitting on it. The elephant-bird's trunk and tail are
tangible proof that Horton has become the baby's social parent; he earns his
parenthood through nurturing care. It seems inevitable that the creature who
hatches from the egg should be visibly related to Horton. When the baby
elephant-bird rides off into the jungle on Horton's trunk, readers of all ages
accept as right that Horton's faithfulness created a real and tangible relationship as significant to both the baby's identity, and to Horton's parenthood,
as the biological relationship.
In Hatching the Egg, I advocate an approach to thinking about family
policy which I term a "generist perspective." 6 A generist perspective, as
exemplified by Horton, recognizes nurture of the next generation as paramount. A generist perspective views adults' relationship to children as one
of responsibilities of trusteeship rather than rights of ownership. Adults'
competing "rights" to control and maintain custody of children should be
replaced by the less adversarial notions of obligation to provide nurture,
authority to act on children's behalf, and standing to participate in collaborative planning to meet the child's needs. In other writings, I have argued that
children are the most vulnerable citizens in our political community.4 7 A
generist perspective demands not only that we tame our penchant for talking in terms of adults' rights to children, but that we replace it with a discourse of children's rights to have their needs met by adults.
But what do I mean by "children's rights"? Children's rights is a rapidly maturing area of law. The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child' shows how radically the concept of children's rights has
changed, and charts a direction for developments in the theory of adult-child
relationships-between parents and children, between cultural and racial
groups and their children, and between nations and their children. Before
the advent of children's rights, children were seen as property or, at best, as
possessing various "interests," but few, if any, so-called "rights." The recent
U.N. Convention, drawing on a spectrum of human rights traditions, invokes
broad notions of children's rights to respect combined with needs-based
rights. Most importantly for this discussion, children's needs for continuity
of relationships and for protection in the formation and preservation of their
religious, cultural, and family identity are articulated as children's rights and
adults' responsibilities.
Consistent with the Convention, a child-centered perspective on issues
of racial identification and cultural heritage would focus on children's rights
to have their needs for identity met and their voices respected by the adults
who care for them and who make laws affecting them. This leaves us with
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the problematic questions of how to determine what children "need" and
what they are trying to "say?" Although we are accustomed to applying a
particular style of rational assessment to these questions, I would argue that
each is highly contingent, subjective, and contextual. In Hatching the Egg, I
urge that we learn to draw on children's own voices and experiences-not
only through their direct testimony, but also by bringing a child-centered
perspective to thinking about children's law" By paying attention to
children's lives, how they grow, and what they say and do, rather than
merely listening to what others say about children, we can begin to mediate
the tensions between independence and dependence, between psychological
relationships to caregivers and relationships to larger social communities,
and between individual and group identity.
B. "Are You My Mother?": In Defense of Matching
If the adopted child constructs her personal identity through intimate
experience, what role remains for the identity of origin? In Hatching the Egg,
my project was to examine stories about children's need for protection of
their relationship with nonbiological, "social" parents like Horton-stepparents, foster parents, lesbian co-parents, grandparents, or other de facto
caregivers. For this reason, I focus the reader's attention on the elephantbird's ears, trunk, and tail-those features that signalled the baby bird's
relationship to the caregiver. One of my colleagues commented sagely after
reading Hatching the Egg, "I loved your story, but tell me the truth-the
baby didn't really look like Horton.""1 Well, yes and no. While ears, trunk,
and tail were important to the parable, the elephant-bird's wings, feathered
body, and bird-like feet were also integral to the elephant bird's identity.
In the final illustration, we see Horton taking the baby elephant-bird
home to a jungle populated by what I called the "family of families"-a
wonderful variety of creatures born of Seuss's imagination. If you look closely, however, you will see that all of the families are composed of look-alike
parents and children. How will Horton's elephant-bird define her difference
in this jungle of sameness?
This is the other half of the story of adoption, and it is equally important to a theory of children's rights. In the book Are You My Mother?, 2 a
baby robin hatches and falls out of the nest while mother is gone. The baby
bird wanders from one to another unlikely mother figure plaintively asking
the question that provides the book's title. As readers, young and old, we
worry when the baby attempts to bond with a dog, a cat, a cow, an airplane, and finally a huge and snorting earth moving machine, asking each of
them "Are you my Mother?" We are delighted, on turning the page, to see
that the steam shovel, instead of crushing the bird in its jagged teeth, has
lifted the baby back into her original nest at the top of the tree. It seems
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appropriate, as a matter of children's rights, that the author, like the current
rules of law, should prefer reunification with the family of origin. He puts
the baby robin back in the nest from which she fell, so she can be raised by
the parent who laid and hatched her.
I had forgotten about this book until Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth
Bartholet, author of Family Bonds 3 pointed it out to me. She critiqued this
book as profoundly anti-adoption. On reflection, it seems neither pro- nor
anti-adoption, but simply a compelling story about displaced children's dual
needs for appropriate care and for continuity with their origins. Although
this intuition is not universally shared, one need not be anti-adoption to join
the fairly broad consensus that children "belong" with their biological families and are served, barring serious perils, by rules that protect their stability
and continuity in their families of origin.
This intuition is matched, however, by another. If the alternative were
to leave the baby bird wandering indefinitely in physical peril and developmental limbo in search of mother, we would be equally delighted to see the
steam shovel place her in the nest of some other appropriate mother who
could speak her language and meet her needs for worms and attention-if
not a robin, then perhaps a sparrow, a finch, or even the rather large hen
she earlier tried to adopt as her mother.
This story, of course, is not offered as logical argument. Any skeptic
would be quick to point out, for example, that people of all colors, unlike
sparrows, robins, and hens, and obviously unlike cats, dogs, and steam
shovels, are members of the same species and can and do produce offspring.
Nevertheless, it embodies the widely shared principle that the first and best
choice for children generally is to preserve and protect the child's biological
family and community of origin from disruption. Unfortunately, sometimes
these "biological" connections have already been ruptured by a foster or
adoptive placement or the child's safety makes removal and the state creation of a new "social" family unit necessary. In our society, as in children's
stories, there are few absolutes and we manage the best endings we can,
given the available story elements.
Both stories embody the intuition that adoption should be structured to
serve children's needs, specifically their needs for early and secure attachments to permanent caregivers and for support of their evolving capacities
as they grow into adults. One listener reflected on the future of the baby
robin if she were placed in the nest of the hen: "Isn't it likely," this African
American woman asked me, "that the baby robin or sparrow, no matter how
much she needs that mother hen right now, might someday want to experience the joy of flight?"' She posed a critical question. Children have characteristics and qualities that they are born with and characteristics and qualities that they acquire in interactions with a larger social reality. The identity
of any child is inevitably shaped by her own and others' perceptions of her
biological and often racial or ethnic kinship. I call this value the child's
"identity of origin." Our children, as they mature, draw meaning from this
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legacy, as they come to understand it, as well as from their relationships to
intimate caregivers. Horton's baby is not born an elephant but an elephanthyphen-bird and she will grow up with a dual legacy. The elephant-bird
belongs to Horton's family, but her wings and the potential for flight belong
to her.
I have argued that out of children's needs we can develop a theory of
children's rights, including rights to protection of identity." When we place
children for adoption across cultural, ethnic, and political frontiers, children's
needs must dominate our decisions about issues such as consideration of
racial and cultural factors, the speed and legal consequences of adoptive
placement, the child's dual citizenship, access to records of birth and identity
of origin, and contacts with community of origin. Our conception of adoption and the adoptive family, I would argue, should be as flexible as possible if we are to further the child-centered goals of adoption.
IV. EXAMINING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-BASED SOLUTIONS
A. The Multiethnic Placement Act: A Clash of Perspectives
Transracial adoption combines some of the most potent dilemmas of
modem America-relationships of race and class and gender, as well as
generational conflicts between parents' rights and children's rights. In the
United States, our history is one of pluralism in constant tension with racism. It is a history of privilege for white protestants, while other ethnic and
racial groups generally begin life in America (and people of color
disproportionately remain) near the bottom of the ladder of material success.' Nonetheless, Americans believe passionately in equality, although
they struggle to define its meaning in practice.
Recently, these tensions have been played out in response to the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 (MPA).s7 Senator Howard Metzenbaum and
other sponsors (including African American Senator from Illinois Carol
Moseley-Braun, and Asian American Senator from Hawaii Daniel K. Inouye)
introduced the Act in the fall of 1993 to address what they perceived as a
serious problem-the delay or denial of adoption of children of color while
social service agencies searched for adoptive parents of the same race or
ethnicity. The MPA was designed to withdraw federal funding from agencies
that delay adoptions because of racial factors, and thus, to force agencies to
shorten and even eliminate barriers caused by racial matching policies. Before its final enactment in the Fall of 1994, the MPA sparked a series of
debates.
At first, the key issue appeared to be one of time: how much time
could reasonably be allowed for finding a placement within the child's racial
or cultural community before the child's interest in acquiring a stable
caregiving relationship began to outweigh the positive value of a same-race
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placement? Many who initially supported the proposal, like Marian Wright
Edelman of the Children's Defense Fund, made it clear that they viewed
transracial adoption as a second choice solution.' These advocates stressed
that the first priority should be preserving biological families and, failing
that, placing children in adoptive families of similar race, culture, and ethnic
background. Similarly, organizations like the Child Welfare League and
American Civil Liberties Union opposed the project and argued that more
effort must be invested in increasing early options by actively recruiting
more racially diverse families and changing procedures to avoid lengthy
stays in foster care.
The bill, however, raised an unexpected furor-some opponents of the
bill argued that it gave too little respect to ethnic identity. They lobbied
successfully to change the wording from "no delay" to "no undue delay." '
Meanwhile, another contingent including several distinguished Harvard professors, both white and black, rallied significant opposition both to this
amendment and to the underlying bill.6 They contended that prohibiting
"undue" delay would only worsen and institutionalize the already severe
delays to which children of color were subjected.' Even more pernicious, in
their view, the bill unconstitutionally endorsed racial separatism because it
implied that government could prefer same race adoption to adoption by
persons of a different race or ethnicity.' Some liberal observers called for a
bill prohibiting racial matching entirely.'
The bill was amended once again, this time to delete the word "undue." s It still implied a preference for placing children within their ethnic
community of origin and a preference for biological over adoptive families.
Section 603(a)(1)(A) and (B) prohibited the delay or denial of an adoption or
foster care placement "solely" on the basis of race, color or national origin.'
This version passed the Senate on March 25, 1994 as part of the Disadvantaged Minority Health Improvement Act of 1994.67 Identical legislation was
introduced in the House.'
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Opposition to the bill came from many quarters. For example, Harvard
Law Professors Elizabeth Bartholet and Randall Kennedy believed consideration of race was unconstitutional.69 Similarly, the American Civil Liberties
Union asserted that race may be included as one factor among many factors,
but that the wording of the bill would allow improper and discriminatory
weight to be given to race." Other groups like the Child Welfare League
were concerned that the bill paid too little attention to the importance of
continuity in children's racial and ethnic communities, as well as too little
71
attention to those communities' own claims to their children.
After a prolonged struggle, the provision was enacted as part of the
Education Act in October of 1994.' In its final form it reads:
(1) PROHIBITION. An agency, or entity, that receives federal assistance and
is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not (A) categorically
deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive
or foster parent, or the child, involved; or (B) delay or deny the placement
of a child for adoption or into foster care, or otherwise discriminate in making a placement decision, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.
(2) PERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATION. An agency or entity to which paragraph (1) applies may consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of
the child and the capacity of the prospective foster or adoptive parents to
meet the needs of a child of this background as one of a number of factors
used to determine the best interest of a child.'

Thus, although race is not a disqualifying factor in adoptive placements, it
may still serve as a factor in assessing children's needs.

The MPA also contains a provision requiring recruitment efforts directed at potential adoptive families that "reflect the ethnic and racial diversity
74
of children in the state for whom foster and adoptive homes are needed."
Critics of racial matching remained deeply concerned by this provision and
by the inclusion of language allowing consideration of race as a "permissible
consideration" in determining the child's best interest.' Ultimately, the impact of the new provisions on the speed of adoptive placements and the
numbers of transracial adoptions will depend in large part on regulations
that are scheduled, under § 553 (c), to be issued within six months7 6
The struggle over the Multiethnic Placement Act exposes the polarized
visions held by various individuals and groups concerning the meaning and
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role of group identity in American society. Professor Twila Perry, an African
American legal scholar from Rutgers University, has captured the dilemma
in her writings about transracial adoption discourse.' She describes the debate as a discourse between two very different perspectives on what values
are important. These perspectives represent radically different views both as
to what is "good" for children and "good" as a matter of social justice. One
viewpoint is characterized by what Professor Perry calls "race blind individualism" and the other by what she calls "color and community consciousness."' The perspective of race blind individualism sees racial matching as
a threat to the individual rights of children to a nurturing home and to the
rights of prospective adoptive parents to equal treatment regardless of their
race or ethnicity.' Race blindness insures that the individual's life will not
be defined and confined by considerations of race and ethnicity.'
The color and community consciousness perspective, Perry argues, sees
race and belonging in a community as inextricably linked and inevitably
defining elements.81 Protecting the child's community, according to the color
and community consciousness perspective, also protects the child, because
the child's life-chances will inevitably be connected to the status of the racial
and ethnic community of which she is visibly a part, even if she is placed
outside that community during her childhood years.'
Professor Perry points out that we in the United States have never had
or even seriously considered a race blind adoption system, since we always
have allowed prospective adoptive parents to choose which race child they
wanted to adopt.' Understandably, people of color, having directly experienced the invidious side of a highly color conscious society, are skeptical
that it can or should become race blind when addressing the claims of white
families to adopt black children. A truly race blind system, Perry asserts,
would allocate parents to children on a first come first served basis, regardless of the color or ethnicity of either.' Why is it that Americans have never really embraced this revolutionary form of color blindness?
The lines between discrimination and sensitivity to a child's needs,
between racial separatism and respect for pluralism, are notoriously difficult
to delineate. The United States Supreme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti" held, in
the context of a child custody dispute, that the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution precludes courts from considering the effects
of racial prejudice, no matter how real, in determining a child's best interest.
In Palmore, a judge had removed a white child from her mother's custody,
reasoning that the child would suffer from the stigma of difference in a
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black community and from hostility to her mother's interracial marriage.
Palmore was the easy case: it involved state interference with a biological
parent's custody, not a state-created adoption-in which the state is charged
with acting, in its parens patraie role, to promote the child's best-interest.
Moreover, the stigma alleged had no connection to the child's own identity
or heritage-the child and her biological parents were of the dominant racial
group, not a minority laboring under a history of discrimination. Yet, the
underlying principle-that giving legal effect to racial or ethnic factors in
evaluating children's interests impermissibly perpetuates racial separatism
and bias-is at the heart of liberal concerns about racial and ethnic matching.
In adoption, considerations of race and ethnicity have often been cast in
a role analogous to their role in affirmative action in the civil rights context-as a response to the effects of racism and as recognition of the fact
that race still matter. Like affirmative action, racial matching seems to pit
individual versus communal identification." The Multiethnic Placement Act
is hardly the first site of struggle over individual versus communal identification of children and the role of the community in determining children's
custody and, ultimately, their identity.' An earlier piece of legislation, the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), explicitly adopted the color and
community consciousness perspective.89 The ICWA mandates tribal involvement in the placement of children eligible for enrollment in the tribe
and establishes a hierarchy of preference for placements of Native American
children, preferring blood family, other members of the same tribe, or other
Native Americans over non-Native American adoptive placements.' In
many cases, it gives exclusive jurisdiction of such adoptions to the Tribal
Courts.
This federal legislation, passed in 1978 when as many as one third of
Native American children were being placed outside their tribes,91 was designed to decrease the number of transcultural adoptions of Native American
children. Whether or not intentionally, some whites continued to adopt Native American children without conforming to the terms of the ICWA.'
These cases produced many poignant stories, in which a law designed to
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insure preservation of a political, ethnic, and cultural community and of its
children's ties to family, tribe, race, and culture was pitted against children's
psychological bonds to non-Native American families who had raised them
from infancy.93
Thus, as with the ICWA, a statutory preference for placing children of
color with families of similar ethnic background may be seen by insiders as
a means of enabling the child to learn the survival skills necessary in a race
conscious society, of preserving the child's heritage, and of strengthening her
sense of identity.' Simultaneously, outsiders may view this preference as
enacting the bigoted constraints against individual liberty associated with
racial separatism and racial determinism.'
Not long after its decision in Palmore, the Supreme Court, without addressing the Indian Child Welfare Act's constitutionality, overturned a lower
court's ruling that would have allowed state court jurisdiction to supplant
tribal court jurisdiction in many ICWA cases.96 Thus, the principles of race
preference embodied in the ICWA continue to coexist uneasily with the race
blindness seemingly mandated by Palmore.
B. Looking at Kinship Through Children's Eyes
My project here is not to take a position as to which of these perspectives is right or wrong-they both seem compelling to me as accurate reflections of different people's experiences, goals, and aspirations. Returning to
Horton's story, one perspective sees primarily the ears and the tail. The
other sees the wings and the feathers.
My contribution to the debate is to suggest that adopting the childcentered perspective I have proposed above might help mediate the disputes
between discussants who seem at present entrenched in polarized positions.
A child-centered perspective would provide a halfway point between these
poles, and would shift the focus to children's needs-based rights defined
through the lens of children's experiences. Adopting the generist, child-centered perspective I outlined earlier, which is reflected in modem trends such
as the Children's Act in England97 and the 1989 U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child,98 one would start with the proposition that biological
and adoptive parents, communities of color, and political communities
should not compete for ownership, but should share in a trusteeship of
children. Rather than asserting rights in children, we should focus on articulating responsibilities. These responsibilities include: (1) an obligation to meet
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children's needs; (2) authority to act on their behalf; and (3) standing to participate in planning for children's care on their journey to adulthood. As
trustees, we are obligated to make every effort to create social systems that
allow children to grow up secure in their families and communities of origin. Both adoption and foster care are important tools. Their purpose, however, is not to give adults equal rights to acquire the children of their choice,
but to provide families for children when the family of origin is not available or presents a serious threat to the child's safety.
Let me end my storytelling with a true story which illustrates my
meaning, but from a child-centered perspective. A children's attorney shared
the story with me after he heard my speech about Horton at the American
Bar Association National Conference on Children and the Law in April
1994." This lawyer had taken over from a colleague a painful case involving a biological mother with a troubled history wanting to reclaim a four
year old who had been raised from infancy by foster parents who wanted to
adopt. The child and mother were black and the foster parents were white.
The lawyer (a seasoned child advocate) assumed he would press for termination of parental rights and adoption by the foster parents, as the lawyer
before him had done. He took the case file home to read it. One entry in
the file absolutely stunned him and caused him to reopen the issue of the
child's need for continuity and identity. It was a psychological study of the
various caregivers and their interactions with the child. The psychologists
used an interesting technique. They sent each adult with the little girl into a
room where the experts could observe the interaction through a two way
mirror. They instructed each grown up to tell the child, "I'll play the little
girl and you play the Mommy." The foster parents took their turns according to the script and it was clear that the child loved and trusted them and
reflected their warm parenting back to them in her play. Then the biological
mother tried the game. "You be the Mommy and I'll be the little girl." The
child seemed perfectly comfortable with the mother but she simply refused
to play the game. Finally, she led the mother over to the mirror and sat
facing her so that their profiles were reflected in the mirror. She traced with
her finger the mother's face and then she traced her own, a smaller version
of her biological mother's profile. "No," she said, "You are the Mommy and
I am the little girl."
Like the attorney in this case, I am always amazed by our ability to
ignore what children are trying to tell us. In a case like this one, in which
the child seemihgly remained strongly identified with her biological mother,
I would argue that the law ought to bend to fit the child's reality, rather
than trying to bend the child to fit some legal or ideological blueprint for
perfection. This is why I believe we need flexible principles like open adoption and kinship adoption, foster care with tenure, and access to adoption
records for adoptees who want to find their families of origin. We need to
expand the options and create more story elements to meet the complex
needs of our children who live in an imperfect world.
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Listening to children's voices suggests that children who are very young
experience their sense of self, family, and community in extremely concrete
terms. They identify as their family and draw their own identity from the
people who take daily care of them and are their psychological parents. As
children mature, however, they begin to define themselves in relation not
only to their caregivers, but also to a larger society and history. As they
begin to integrate more complex understandings of who they are and how
they fit into the world, children themselves and the larger society that surrounds them both take on a greater role in defining them. As a result, biological, racial, and cultural identities take on increasing importance in their
development.
I would argue that, as trustees, we must structure adoption and foster
care polices that preserve children's long term access to their cultural and
racial legacies to the greatest extent possible, even as we recognize and protect their short term needs for security and nurture. We must be blind to
group interests at times, because children are blind in their attachments. To
deprive a child of her "Mommy" or "Daddy" because of color, ethnicity or
political jurisdiction, violates the child's right to protection of her intimate
relationships. On the other hand, we need to be color and community conscious because our children grow up in a pluralist and sometimes a racist
society in which group identities do matter and, many would argue, should
matter as an element of group pride and a healthy sense of belonging. A
mandate that race and ethnicity may play no role at all in adoptive placement, while seeming to provide a shield against discrimination, actually
discriminates against the child who is placed for adoption. Such a law ignores the impact on the child of race and ethnicity and deprives the child of
a potentially valuable legacy.
C. Children's Identity Rights
What do this theoretical framework and the narratives I have outlined
mean to the legal question of preserving children's identity across visible
boundaries and at the intersections of culture, community, and time? The
complex interplay between children's immediate survival needs, their relationships to parent figures, and their long term quest for identity and a
sense of community are present in many of the stories children tell and the
stories that we read to them. For most young children, these rights do not
conflict because most children are raised in their family and community of
origin. Where biological parents live apart, the laws on visitation go far
toward protecting children's contacts with the noncustodial parent and help
to preserve those aspects of the child's family, ethnic, and racial legacy
which are not a part of daily life in her custodial family. Although issues of
identity can be complex in divorce, they are potentially more complex in the
adoptive or foster family and are particularly salient in transracial or transnational adoptions that cross visible boundaries. In such situations, children
may need specially tailored protections. Perhaps they need the power to
claim more complex rights of identity.
These rights arguably have two important components that the law
ought to acknowledge and respect. The first component is children's right to
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protection of their "personal identity"-defined as their sense of self developed in relation to those they call "family." I refer, here, to the social family
that children construct from their daily experiences in interactions with their
caregivers, the people Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would call the psychological parents."W As a pragmatic matter, every child needs a safe and secure
caregiving relationship in order to survive infancy and to begin forming any
identity at all. Children have a needs-based right to protection of their intimate caregiving relationships and to a voice in defining their own family.
I would also argue, however, that children's identity has a second component, one that becomes more important as children mature. I would designate this the child's right to claim her "identity of origin," defined as a right
to know and explore, commensurate with her evolving capacity for autonomy, her identity as a member of the family and group into which she was
born. The trusteeship model of adult power implies that we adults (including adoptive and biological parents, cultural and racial groups, states and
nations) have a duty to recognize and protect the child's access to this heritage, as well as recognizing and protecting the young child's need for continuity in her psychological or social family.
V.

CONCLUSION

Adults suffer from a singular inability to hear and see when children
begin talking about ambiguities. I have suggested that the law ought to bend
to fit the child's reality, rather than trying to bend the child to fit some legal
or ideological blueprint for seamless perfection. To meet the complex needs
of children as well as their caregivers, we should strive for a system that
provides a full array of flexible tools, to be used when developmentally and
legally appropriate.
These options should include not only traditional adoption, with its
nuclear family model, but also open adoption, which allows creation of new
ties without necessarily severing the old, and kinship adoption, which also
maintains children's ties with families of origin. Ideas like longterm kinship
foster care, group homes for teens, and foster care with tenure need not be
dismissed simply because they fail to reflect the nuclear family model. Laws
should respect children's rights to visitation with biological siblings and
extended family. We should encourage exploration of novel concepts like
"community visitation," which can provide a context in which children are
able to explore their kinship with racial and cultural communities of origin.' As they mature, all adopted children should have the right of access
to adoption records if they wish to know their biological origins or to make
contact with their families of origin.
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These proposals, I recognize, challenge dominant paradigms of the
adoptive family and also ask adults to make major sacrifices of their autonomy and their privacy. Our conceptions of children's rights, however, are in a
state of active revolution. Increasingly, society as well as legal reform is
defining children as rights-bearing individuals who are entitled to a system
of norms recognizing their unique needs. Acknowledging that children's
individuality is nurtured and develops within the context of family, group,
and community can help resolve many adoption dilemmas. A healthy respect for children's dual rights to protection of both their identities of origin
and their socially constructed identities can help adults mediate the tensions,
in defining and justifying adult power over children, between individual and
group claims, between claims of social and biological kinship, and between
claims of individual and collective identity.

